Recently, the decisions of the Constitutional Court have become one of the focuses in the dynamics of Indonesian state administration. This research discusses the relevance of political constellation in Indonesia and its influence on the changing character of several constitutional court decisions from selfexecuting to non-self executing. This research aims to find out how the legal impact of shifting the character of the Constitutional Court's decision in its implementation. This research is a normative study supported by a law, case and conceptual approach. The data used are secondary data, obtained by means of a literature research which is then arranged systematically and analyzed with qualitative analysis. From the results of the analysis it is known that the shift in the character in several decisions of the Constitutional Court was carried out as an effort to offset the political constellation in the legislators. The character shift is done in the hope that it can guarantee the execution of the Constitutional Court's ruling and can be followed up on by the decision of the ruling. This shows that Constitutional Court judges are trying to find a legal breakthrough in the corridor of judicial activism to make an ideal constitutional review decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
The written constitution is in principle, the most important legal and political remedy for the implementation of constitutionality. Therefore it is necessary for the functioning of each democratic political system that a constitution is implemented.
The top principle of existence and functioning of the democratic society and a state governed by the rule of law is the supremacy of the Constitution, which is at the same time the principal concept of the constitutional review. In the constitutional review discourse, there is a firm conviction that law enforcement must be able to give meaning to the state system, especially to uphold basic human rights in the constitution. 1 The diversity and complexity of successful constitutional cultures, that it is possible to conceive of many different yet equally reasonable ways to address each area of constitutional concern. 2 The constitutional court's power to supervise the development of ordinary law, however, will almost inevitably be limited. 3 The ideas and legal theories of Kelsen and his model of the court as a negative legislator have influenced the design of specialized constitutional courts in the Western world. Kelsen, in accordance with his positivist jurisprudence, believed in a strict hierarchy of law and that ordinary judges should only apply a law that is legislated by the parliament. Kelsen believed that the constitution ought to be the supreme law of the land and that no statute could violate it. 4 To effectively restrain the legislature and ensure the compatibility of law with the higher normative order of the constitution, Kelsen believed, a special, extrajudicial organ was necessary.
The Kelsenian model establishes a centralized body outside of the structure of the conventional judiciary to exercise constitutional review and act as the guarantor of the constitutional order. This body, typically called a constitutional court, operates as a negative legislator because it has the power to reject but not propose legislation. 5 Some features of constitutional courts also press them in the direction of activism. 6 In the construction of the Indonesian Constitution, the institutions tasked with guarding and ensuring the constitutionality of the law are the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (hereinafter abbreviated as MK). Through its decision, it not only fulfills the role of guarantor of constitutional supremacy but also contributes to the understanding and application of fundamental principles in the law or rule of law. 7 The Constitutional Court can assess and decide the act that has been ratified by the President if it is true that the act passed by the President violates the normative provisions of the regulation above (in this case the 1945 Constitution). Therefore, the Constitutional Court can state that the Law is null and void in part or in the whole of the articles of the law submitted for "constitutional review". Reviewing of the Act by the Constitutional Court is an assessment of political products created between the president and the legislative council or regional council on the material of a law. So that the product of the law created and approved by the president really does not conflict with the 1945 Constitution or the interests of community rights. In constitutional cases, 8 whenever the text is vague, legislatures have a free choice in borderline cases and cannot be second-guessed by judges.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia is one of the state institutions that always attract the attention of many circles, not least related to the decisions produced regarding the reviewing of laws. Initially the decision to review the law is only in the form of an amber that grants an application, declares that the application cannot be accepted and rejects the application for part or all by stating a law, article, paragraph or phrase contradicts the 1945 5 Tom Ginsburg, "Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political and Judicial Audiences,"Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 28, no. 3 (2011) : 540. Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and states that it has no binding legal force (legally null and void). 9 But today the Constitutional Court has also created a variant of the decision, namely a conditionally unconstitutional decision; a conditionally constitutional decision; decisions that delay the application of the decision (limited constitutional); and decisions that formulate new norms. 10 The Constitutional Court through the four variants of the decision is often considered to have changed its role from negative legislature 11 to positive legislature. 12 The Constitutional Court in this corridor made itself as the third room in the legislative process because it cannot be denied that the variant of the decision influenced the legislative process in the legislature. This is an external control tool that is owned by the Constitutional Court to carry out purification of the legal products produced by the legislative institution despite the polemic of the Constitutional Court as a positive legislature.
At the next level, the variant of the Constitutional Court's decision as mentioned above carries its own dynamics in the character of the Constitutional Court's decision. This can be seen from the decision which tends to need further regulation. 13 Another thing that also needs to be considered is that considering the norms in the law are a unified system, there is an implementation of decisions that must go through certain stages that depend on the substance of the relevant decision. In this case, there are decisions that can be directly implemented without having to make new regulations or changes and some need further regulation first. 14 When a decision will be effective immediately 9
As stipulated in Article 56 paragraph (3) and Article 57 paragraph (1) without the need for further action in the form of the need to implement the amended law, this decision can be said to be self-executing, 15 in the sense that the decision is carried out by itself. This happens because the negated norm has certain characteristics that can be applied automatically without changes or with changes in laws that contain the norms reviewed and negated. In the end, the decision to review the law is not only directly executable but also those that cannot be directly executed (not self-executing). This is one of the dynamics that occur related to the shift in the character of the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the review of the law. Indonesia differently from the decision of the judicial review. The decision in its implementation was strongly influenced by the political constellation. The law is a product of politics itself so that decisions related to this matter will also be influenced by the ongoing political constellation.
Based on the above background, the problem raised in this study is whether the political constellation in Indonesia affects the shift in the character of the 
II. RESULT & DISCUSSION

Origin of the Concept of Self Executing to Non-Self Executing
The Constitutional Court has affirmed itself as a guardian of democracy which upholds the principles of substantive justice in every decision, 17 therefore the Court is judged as a judicial institution whose performance and authority are guided by the enforcement of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy.
The Constitutional Court also functions as a derivation of its citizens, namely as the guardian of constitution, the interpreter of constitution, the protector of citizen constitutional rights and the protector of human rights. 18 Court's decision had legal consequences for all parties relating to the decision. This is because the Constitutional Court's decision is different from the general court ruling which only binds parties (inter parties). All parties must comply with and implement the Constitutional Court's decision. In the Constitutional Court's decision related to the judicial review of the law for example, if the Constitutional Court decides an Act against the Constitution and declares it has no binding power, the decision is not only binding on the party who filed a case in the Constitutional Court but also binding for all citizens (erga omnes). 22 Besides that the Constitutional Court ruling also applies the principle of res judicata pro veritatehabetur, meaning that the judge's decision must be considered correct and must be carried out. So that there is no reason not to carry out the Constitutional Court's decision, even without any forced efforts by any party to carry out the Constitutional Court Decision (the principle of self-respect). 23 The Constitutional Court is also due to being the first and last court, so there is no other legal effort that can be taken. A decision if no legal remedy can be taken means that it has a permanent legal force (in kracht van gewijsde) and obtains a binding force (resjudicata pro veritatehabetur). 24 The decision of the Constitutional Court since it was pronounced before a court that is open to the public can have three powers, namely: 25
Binding Power
The power of binding on the Constitutional Court's ruling is different from that of an ordinary court, not only includes parties who are litigants, namely the applicant, government, House of Representatives (DPR)/ House of Regional Representatives (DPD), or related parties who are permitted to enter the proceedings, but the decision is also binding on all people, state institutions, is interpreted, only if the same party is submitted with the same subject matter. In relation to the constitutional case whose verdict is erga omnes, the petition for reviewing the same material has been decided. The decision of the Constitutional Court which has the legal power to remain so can be used as a positive proof of force with certainty that what has been decided by the judge has been considered correct. The opposite proof is not permitted.
Executorial Strength
As a legal act of a state official intended to end a dispute that will nullify or create a new law, then, of course, it is expected that the decision is not only dead words on paper. As a judge's decision, each person will then talk about how it will be implemented in reality. However, as mentioned above, it is different from the ordinary judge's decision, then a decision that has been binding on the parties in a civil case gives the party won the right to request that the verdict be executed if it concerns the punishment of the loser to do something or pay a sum of money. In such a case it is said that the decision that has permanent legal force has executive strength, namely that the decision is carried out and if necessary by force. the constitutional authority to make the law based on its own policy base, while the judiciary that has the authority to examine the law is negative 26 Syukri Asyari, et. Al., "Model dan Implementasi": 694.
27
A. Fickar Hadjar, et.al legislator because the judiciary carries out legislative functions in order to annul the law, an action that Kelsen considered as making a law negatively. 29
Nevertheless, Kelsen has warned from the beginning that the differentiation of parliamentary legislative functions from the judiciary as a positive legislator and negative legislator will fade when the judiciary enters the territory to protect the constitutional rights of citizens. The judiciary when examining cases in order to protect constitutional rights will explore and seek a measure of the scope of constitutional rights. In this context, the court will become that is not in accordance with the corridor of restriction as that has been set. The provisions are as follows:
Article 57
The verdict of the Constitutional Court whose verdict stated that the content of paragraph, article and/or section of the law contradicted the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the material contained in the paragraph, article and/or section of the law had no power binding law.
The decision of the Constitutional Court which has its decision stated that the establishment of the said law does not fulfill the provisions for the establishment of laws based on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the law does not have binding legal force.
(2a) The decision of the Constitutional Court does not contain:
Amber other than as referred to in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2); order to the legislator; and the formulation of norms as a substitute for the norms of the law which are stated to be contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
DPR felt that the decision variant that was often raised by the 
Political Constellation in the Context of the Constitutional Court Decision
Judicial power is always inherent in politics, and basically, it is identical with concepts such as influence, persuasion, manipulation, coercion, force, and authority. In this context the nature of power can be reviewed into six dimensions, first, the potential and actual dimensions mean that one can have the potential for power, such as wealth, land, weapons, knowledge, social status, popularity and so on. Next, the dimensions of consensus and coercion are the two contradictory concepts. In the dimension of coercion, politics will be seen as a form of struggle, domination, and conflict, while the dimension of consensus, power is more interpreted as an effort to unite these various conflicts and make it a situation to organize society in general. 32 For information that some scholars argue that Constitutional Court adopts strong form of constitutional review in deciding cases concerning economic and social rights. In the power orientation, Indonesian politics before and after the reformation cannot be said to experience significant changes, where it can be measured in an orientation perspective. The main orientation of Indonesian politics still revolves around the idea of power and not the effectiveness of power use. This is really surprising because power struggles can only be justified if it can be shown that in practice they are able to use power exercise in a way that brings benefits to as many people as possible. 34 The study proves that law is a political product so the character of the contents of each legal product will be very determined or colored by the balance of power or political configuration that gave birth to it. A fact that cannot be denied, that the formation of law in a country including in Indonesia cannot be separated from the influence of the prevailing political system, including in this case the influence of the national political system of the country itself. 35
Events that occur in the contextual context in this matter regarding the Constitutional Court's decision, it does not necessarily make the Constitutional Court's decision directly understood deterministically-empirically, that is, from the judge's decision then trigger the implementation that is in accordance with 34 In the case of Indonesia, it is very evident that the impetus for power struggles is far higher than the impetus for the right use of power. Symptoms such as the emergence of so many political parties are intensively consolidating themselves to form external organ units, on the other hand, the parties that consolidate with the support of a broad constituency actually experience a split into (internal fractioning). There is a complicated typology in this section, but from the large currents of political power that are currently consolidating, on the one hand, Therefore, to maintain legal order with regulations that stipulate that its hierarchy is lower must not be contradictory to higher regulations, it will attach laws with laws that cost contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the DPR and the President must immediately be obeyed and acted upon by the President to immediately amend the law to be adjusted to the decision of the Constitutional Court.
In the judiciary tradition that has been developing for a long time, a decision must have binding nature, because this is related to the absolute authority of the judiciary, which has the power to make judgments. Of course it is useless if a decision that takes the process sometimes takes a very long and tiring tempo, but in the end, it does not have binding legal force, the result is just a waste.
Problems at the level of implementation/execution of decisions like this are often the organs of the Constitutional Court, because there is no executorial institution for the decisions of the two courts, and there is no threat of serious sanctions if they do not implement the decisions of both organs. 41 interests can threaten to obstruct the court intended outcome. This is also evident from several Constitutional Court decisions that are not applicable because they seem to be ignored by the decision address. Based on the analysis conducted on the constitutional court's decisions related to forestry, plantations, and mining, it can be said that the level of compliance of state administrators can be seen based on whether or not a constitutional court decision is granted which is either partially or wholly by state administrators, DPR, to the judiciary. The government and the DPR appear to be more disobedient to the decisions of the constitutional court. One of them seemed in the absence of a constitutional court decision that cancels a norm in the Plantation Law but it is not accommodated by the government and parliament in revising the Plantation Law, then there is also no response from the government to the decision the constitutional court related to the judicial review of the Forestry Law, especially regarding the issue of the mechanism of inauguration and abolition of customary law communities as mandated by Article 67 paragraph (1), paragraph (2), and paragraph (3) of the Forestry Law which is considered constitutional by the Constitutional Court but the government instrument to date mechanism inauguration and abolition of indigenous law community does not yet exist. Slightly different from the general court that handles criminal acts of natural resources that are more obedient to the decisions of the constitutional court by using the decisions of the relevant constitutional court as a consideration in deciding cases. 44 As a result, the Constitutional Court's decision is not implementable in its character, when it reaches the application stage, the Constitutional Court Decision will be blocked by many obstacles that interfere with the execution of the decision. Therefore it is necessary to have a collective awareness strategy of all state institutions and other non-state organs, to jointly apply the Constitutional Court's decisions to conditions that are clearly desired by the constitution. The implementation of the Constitutional Court's ruling will be very absurd without a positive response from the legislative and the government forming organs in general. During this time there are often gaps and disparities between the stages of reading and the implementation of final decisions in the field. If this big problem is left unchecked, undoubtedly the decision of the Constitutional Court will only have a symbolic power that adorns the state news sheet.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the discussion above, related to the shift in the character of the constitutional court's decision from self-executing to not self-executing, it came to the conclusion that the dynamics were influenced by Indonesia's political conditions which influenced the constitutional court judges. Adressat often ignore the decisions of the Constitutional Court and policy makers as if they do not obey so that the Constitutional Court's decision cannot be implemented to create a state that remains unconstitutional. The reality is that sometimes the Constitutional Court's decisions are ignored and are not followed up by the legislative council of the people and the President as the legislative body. Because of it, Constitutional Court judges must try to find legal breakthroughs in the corridors of judicial activism to create applicable constitutional review decisions.
The judges created a decision variant that was more directed to the decision of non-self executing. The existence of the nature of non-self executing because to carry out the Constitutional Court's decision still needs to be followed up with the next, namely the follow-up by the executor of the decision either through the legislative or regulatory process. It was said so because the ruling influenced other norms and requested a revision or making new laws or regulations that were more operational in their implementation. In other words, this decision cannot easily be carried out without the presence of new laws or other regulatory products because it can lead to a legal vacuum. This is what reflects the change
